dws
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses local Python scripts to automate multi-step DingTalk operations by executing the
dwsbinary throughsubprocess.run(). This is observed in several scripts such asscripts/bulk_add_fields.py,scripts/import_records.py, andscripts/todo_batch_create.py. This behavior is legitimate and aligns with the skill's primary function as an administrative tool wrapper. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). The agent has the capability to read content from various external and potentially untrusted sources, including DingTalk documents (
doc read), emails (mail message get), and chat conversations (chat message list). Malicious instructions could be embedded in these sources to manipulate the agent's logic. - Ingestion points: Document reading (
references/products/doc.md), email retrieval (references/products/mail.md), and chat message retrieval (references/products/chat.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide specific instructions to the agent to disregard or delimit embedded instructions within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses broad capabilities, including sending messages (
chat message send), modifying records (aitable record update), and managing organizational data, which could be abused if an injection succeeds. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata