rstore-monospace

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes functionality for loading and processing external OpenAPI documents and system schema metadata (such as meta collections and constraints) from remote projects or local JSON files. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed data contains malicious instructions targeting the agent interpreting these schemas.
  • Ingestion points: loadMonospaceCollections accepts url, project, input (OpenAPI JSON), and metadataInput (metadata snapshot).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the processed schemas.
  • Capability inventory: The skill describes capabilities for network operations via a REST client, file reading for local schemas, and data mutation (CRUD) through rstore collection APIs.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic for the ingested external schema data is described in the workflow.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill references several types of secrets including apiKey, schemaApiKey, and runtimeApiKey. These are documented as configuration parameters for APIs like createMonospaceRestClient and loadMonospaceCollections. The documentation correctly advises maintaining schemaApiKey on the build/server side, which is a standard security practice. No hardcoded credentials or private keys were detected.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references several Node.js packages such as @rstore/monospace, rstore-vue, rstore-vite-monospace, and rstore-nuxt-monospace. These resources are consistent with the skill's purpose and appear to be official components belonging to the vendor ecosystem.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 06:50 PM