flux-operator-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes functionality to download and install new AI agent skills from remote OCI artifact repositories via the
flux-operator skills installcommand. This allows for the dynamic extension of the agent's instruction set from external sources. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation describes access to sensitive local files for cluster authentication and GitOps synchronization, specifically targeting
~/.kube/config, SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_ed25519), and SOPS/Age encryption keys (age.key,private-key.pem). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process YAML manifests from remote and potentially untrusted URLs (e.g.,
flux-operator diff yaml,flux-operator install -f). - Ingestion points: Manifest files loaded from GitHub, GitLab, or OCI URLs during diff, build, or installation operations.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows full cluster lifecycle management, secret creation, and dynamic skill installation.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in manifests are documented.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify validation or sanitization steps for remote manifest content before execution or processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is granted administrative control over Kubernetes clusters, including installing/uninstalling operators, modifying system-level resources, and managing reconciliation logic.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation provides examples of creating Kubernetes secrets by passing credentials (passwords, tokens, and SSH keys) directly through command-line flags, which can expose sensitive information in shell history or process listings.
Audit Metadata