cmux
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes heavy use of terminal commands to drive the
cmuxCLI, including subcommands likecmux workspace create,cmux send, andcmux hooks setup. It also explicitly instructs the agent to launch other agents (Codex, Claude, Pi) with flags that bypass standard security permissions and sandboxes (e.g.,--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox,--dangerously-skip-permissions). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill facilitates the injection of environment variables from
.envfiles into workspaces using the--env-fileflag. While it includes instructions to mask these values and avoid reading them directly, the mechanism itself handles sensitive API keys (e.g.,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,OPENROUTER_API_KEY). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task descriptions and orchestrates multiple agents. It is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) where data processed by one agent inside a
cmuxsurface could contain malicious instructions that influence the orchestrating agent's next actions. - Ingestion points: Data is read from terminal surfaces using
cmux read-screen(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for isolating agent output from orchestrator instructions.
- Capability inventory: Full shell access via
cmux, capability to spawn/kill processes, and network-enabled agents. - Sanitization: None described; the skill relies on the agent to 'read back to verify'.
Audit Metadata