sssf
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework sequences shell commands for repository management and external tool interaction as part of its primary design.
- Evidence:
templates/adws/adw_modules/git_helper.pyperforms core Git operations like branch management and committing via subprocess calls. - Evidence:
templates/adws/adw_modules/agent_pi.pyspawns the Pi coding agent subprocess to execute LLM-driven tasks. - Evidence:
templates/adws/adw_modules/quality.pyfacilitates the execution of local development tools including linting and test runners. - Evidence:
templates/adws/adw_modules/gates.pyutilizesshell=Truewithin itstests_passfactory for flexible test verification, though this is restricted to pre-defined commands in the workflow scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements multi-agent pipelines where data is passed between agents, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through user-provided prompts in ADW scripts (e.g.,
templates/adws/adw_build.py) and is subsequently passed as JSON envelopes to downstream agents. - Boundary markers: Data is separated using Markdown headings in templates (e.g.,
templates/prompt_engineering/builder/user.md), but lacks hardened delimiters or explicit "ignore" instructions for the variable sections. - Capability inventory: Agents possess significant capabilities including repository modification and shell access via the underlying
piagent framework. - Sanitization: Prompt and envelope data are interpolated into Markdown templates without advanced sanitization or structural validation against injection patterns.
Audit Metadata