kuroco-content-structure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of content definitions that ingest data from external and internal sources, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
apifield types (external API URLs),relationfield types (references to other content records), andwysiwygorhtmlfield types (direct user/editor input). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify boundary markers or "ignore instructions" prompts for handling data returned from external APIs or relations.
- Capability inventory: Content structures can perform network operations via the
apifield and execute logic via Smarty templates. - Sanitization: The skill explicitly documents the
allow_all_tagsparameter forwysiwygandhtmlfields, which bypasses the default server-side sanitization that normally removes potentially dangerous tags like<script>. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for configuring dynamic logic execution within content structures.
- Template Evaluation: The
apifield type (ext_type 32) supports theuse_smartyparameter, which enables the evaluation of configured URLs as Smarty templates at runtime. - JavaScript Hooks: The configuration allows specifying JavaScript hook names (
on_select_hook,on_save_hook) that are executed during user interactions with the API picker. - Custom Processing: The skill mentions endpoint post-processing using
api_methodandappendto dynamically manipulate content responses at runtime.
Audit Metadata