kuroco-content-structure

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of content definitions that ingest data from external and internal sources, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via api field types (external API URLs), relation field types (references to other content records), and wysiwyg or html field types (direct user/editor input).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify boundary markers or "ignore instructions" prompts for handling data returned from external APIs or relations.
  • Capability inventory: Content structures can perform network operations via the api field and execute logic via Smarty templates.
  • Sanitization: The skill explicitly documents the allow_all_tags parameter for wysiwyg and html fields, which bypasses the default server-side sanitization that normally removes potentially dangerous tags like <script>.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for configuring dynamic logic execution within content structures.
  • Template Evaluation: The api field type (ext_type 32) supports the use_smarty parameter, which enables the evaluation of configured URLs as Smarty templates at runtime.
  • JavaScript Hooks: The configuration allows specifying JavaScript hook names (on_select_hook, on_save_hook) that are executed during user interactions with the API picker.
  • Custom Processing: The skill mentions endpoint post-processing using api_method and append to dynamically manipulate content responses at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 01:48 AM