repo-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the analyzed repository and external GitHub issues which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Stage 1 reads repository configuration files (e.g.,
.claude/,CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md) and fetches all open GitHub issues and epics into the context. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (via analysis tools) and perform network requests (to fetch issues).
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is mentioned for the ingested repository data or issue descriptions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several command-line tools to perform deterministic code analysis.
- Evidence: The
playbook.mdfile instructs the agent to run tools such asknip,ts-prune,vulture,madge,dependency-cruiser, andjscpdto detect dead code and architectural issues. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses package runners to download and execute tools from public registries at runtime.
- Evidence: The instructions specify using
npx <tool>for JavaScript/TypeScript anduvx/pipx run <tool>for Python-based analysis. These downloads target well-known package registries (npm and PyPI) and are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of auditing codebases. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill describes an orchestration pattern that involves dynamically spawning multiple agent personas to process findings.
- Evidence: Stage 2 and the 'Illustrative Workflow sketch' describe using a
Workflowtool withparallel()andagent()primitives to execute independent personas (e.g., 'Deletionist', 'Architect') using the Sonnet model.
Audit Metadata