skills/djalmajr/skills-teo/debate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

debate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles and executes shell commands using the herdr tool (e.g., herdr agent start <nome> --kind <kind> --pane <pane-id>). While the skill provides regex constraints for the agent names ([a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}), the assembly of these commands from user-provided intake data represents a potential command injection surface if the parameters are not strictly sanitized by the execution environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a mediator, ingesting and processing text files (turnos/*.md) generated by independent sub-agents. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a sub-agent could attempt to influence the mediator's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The mediator reads the output of sub-agents using herdr agent read or by directly accessing files in the turnos/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses strict Markdown templates (e.g., templates/turno.md) and a shared agenda to delimit responses.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities through the herdr tool and file system write access for managing artifacts.
  • Sanitization: A mandatory 'Gate of Quality' (qualidade.md) is used to validate each turn, checking for school adherence, citation accuracy, and formatting before the data is integrated into the synthesis.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and manages external agent processes at runtime based on the intake configuration. It orchestrates a multi-pane layout and issues commands to sub-agents, relying on dynamic logic to control the debate flow and handle retries.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 10:22 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — debate