clothing-grass-planting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses child_process.spawn in scripts/lib/providers.mjs to invoke the vendor-owned dlazy CLI tool for image generation. This tool is executed with arguments derived from user input, though it uses safe invocation methods that avoid shell interpretation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generation scripts communicate with external AI service providers including OpenAI, Google Gemini, Fal.ai, Replicate, and Volcengine. It also supports fetching image assets from remote URLs provided by the user.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user prompts and images and incorporates them into instructions sent to AI models, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied strings via the --prompt flag and image paths/URLs via the --images flag in scripts/gen.mjs.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary delimiters or safety instructions when interpolating user content into the final model prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local disk (persist in gen.mjs), perform network requests (fetch in providers.mjs), and execute a local binary (execFileJson in providers.mjs).
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of user-provided prompt text or image metadata before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 06:47 AM