clothing-grass-planting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
child_process.spawninscripts/lib/providers.mjsto invoke the vendor-owneddlazyCLI tool for image generation. This tool is executed with arguments derived from user input, though it uses safe invocation methods that avoid shell interpretation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The generation scripts communicate with external AI service providers including OpenAI, Google Gemini, Fal.ai, Replicate, and Volcengine. It also supports fetching image assets from remote URLs provided by the user.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user prompts and images and incorporates them into instructions sent to AI models, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied strings via the
--promptflag and image paths/URLs via the--imagesflag inscripts/gen.mjs. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary delimiters or safety instructions when interpolating user content into the final model prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local disk (
persistingen.mjs), perform network requests (fetchinproviders.mjs), and execute a local binary (execFileJsoninproviders.mjs). - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or filtering of user-provided prompt text or image metadata before processing.
Audit Metadata