image-fusion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
node:child_processspawnwithinscripts/lib/providers.mjsto execute the vendor'sdlazyCLI tool. This is a legitimate primary function of the skill. The implementation avoids shell injection risks by passing arguments as an array rather than using a shell environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/gen.mjsscript usesfetchto download generated assets from official AI provider domains, such asdlazy.comandopenai.com, to save them to the localoutput/directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of image files and URLs provided by the user or agent.
- Ingestion points: The
--imagesparameter inscripts/gen.mjsand thereq.imagesarray inscripts/lib/providers.mjsserve as points where external paths or URLs enter the skill context. - Boundary markers: Prompts and image references are passed as distinct, separate arguments to API endpoints and CLI tools, maintaining a clear boundary between instructions and data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system access (
readFile,writeFile), network operations (fetch), and subprocess management (spawn) acrossscripts/gen.mjsandscripts/lib/providers.mjs. - Sanitization: Subprocess execution is hardened against injection via the use of
spawnwith argument arrays. Image inputs are encoded to base64 or passed as URLs to established providers, limiting their execution potential within the host environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes provider-specific commands in
scripts/lib/providers.mjsbased on environment variables and model selection. This logic is well-structured and follows expected vendor-provided SDK patterns.
Audit Metadata