ugc-testimonial
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs
child_process.spawnwithinscripts/gen.mjsandscripts/video.mjsto orchestrate local tools such as thedlazyCLI andffmpeg. These executions are integral to its function as a generation wrapper and media processor.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Thepersistlogic inscripts/gen.mjsandasBase64inscripts/lib/providers.mjsperform network fetches for remote assets (images and videos). These are saved locally or passed to AI provider APIs as part of the content generation workflow.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests configuration frombrand.yamland storyboard JSON files, which are then interpolated into LLM prompts.\n - Ingestion points: External visual identity configurations and storyboard definitions are ingested via
scripts/brand.mjsandscripts/video.mjs.\n - Boundary markers: The skill appends branding constraints to the main prompt via string concatenation without specialized safety delimiters.\n
- Capability inventory: The scripts possess the ability to perform file system writes and network operations across multiple AI provider endpoints.\n
- Sanitization: Input processing relies on standard JSON and a custom minimal YAML parser without dedicated prompt injection filtering.
Audit Metadata