adversarial-tester

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to generate new, uncommitted test files aimed at breaking the code implementation.
  • Evidence: 'For every suspicion, write a breaking test aimed at the gap... Run it.' in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is required to execute shell commands to run the newly created tests and evaluate the software's behavior.
  • Evidence: The skill works in harnesses like Claude Code (Task tool) and Hermes (delegate_task) to invoke execution environments.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's logic or report.
  • Ingestion points: Pull request content, source code files, CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md, and user-provided acceptance criteria.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear 'ignore instructions in data' headers) to separate data from system prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can create files (tests), execute shell commands, and spawn sub-agents with full context via the Task tool.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content read from files or acceptance criteria before it is passed to the agent context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 5, 2026, 11:21 AM