adversarial-tester
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to generate new, uncommitted test files aimed at breaking the code implementation.
- Evidence: 'For every suspicion, write a breaking test aimed at the gap... Run it.' in
SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is required to execute shell commands to run the newly created tests and evaluate the software's behavior.
- Evidence: The skill works in harnesses like Claude Code (Task tool) and Hermes (delegate_task) to invoke execution environments.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's logic or report.
- Ingestion points: Pull request content, source code files,
CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md, and user-provided acceptance criteria. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear 'ignore instructions in data' headers) to separate data from system prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can create files (tests), execute shell commands, and spawn sub-agents with full context via the
Tasktool. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content read from files or acceptance criteria before it is passed to the agent context.
Audit Metadata