write-great-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local validation and testing scripts.
- Evidence: Step 5 in
SKILL.mdexecutesnode <this-skill>/scripts/check-skill.mjsand Step 7 executes<this-skill>/scripts/fires.sh. - Evidence:
scripts/fires.shutilizes theclaudeCLI tool to simulate and verify trigger phrases for new skills. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied requests and procedure descriptions, which serves as a surface for potential instruction injection in the generated output.
- Ingestion points: User interview responses (Step 1) and the content of the target skill folder (Step 5 and Step 7).
- Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to use structured templates and mechanical scripts, though it lacks explicit isolation markers for every interpolation point.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system access and local script execution capabilities.
- Sanitization:
scripts/check-skill.mjsvalidates the structural integrity and frontmatter but does not perform semantic safety filtering of the generated content. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the generation and execution of scripts based on provided templates.
- Evidence:
references/skill-template.mdprovides templates for Bash scripts that the agent is prompted to create and execute. - Evidence: Internal Node.js and Bash scripts are invoked at runtime to manage the development and verification workflow.
- [SAFE]: The skill includes robust security and safety instructions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/review-checklist.mdexplicitly mandate the avoidance of hardcoded secrets and require human approval for system-impacting actions. - Evidence:
scripts/fires.shproactively disables dangerous tools (Write, Edit, Bash) using the--disallowedToolsflag when performing trigger testing simulations.
Audit Metadata