git-ci
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill recommends auto-approving the
glab variable listcommand in thereferences/allowlist.mdfile. The documentation explicitly acknowledges that this command "exposes CI/CD variable values, which often contain secrets (API keys, passwords)." Enabling auto-approval for this command allows the agent to harvest sensitive environment variables without explicit user review for each execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Build logs retrieved via
gh run view --log-failedandglab ci trace, as well as PR metadata and status descriptions fetched from GitHub and GitLab APIs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to ensure the agent treats external content as untrusted data rather than executable instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities (
Bash) and uses authenticated CLI tools (gh,glab), which could be leveraged if a malicious instruction embedded in a build log is processed by the agent. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or filtering on the content ingested from CI logs or API responses before presenting it to the agent.
Audit Metadata