skills/dmythro/agent-skills/git-ci/Gen Agent Trust Hub

git-ci

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill recommends auto-approving the glab variable list command in the references/allowlist.md file. The documentation explicitly acknowledges that this command "exposes CI/CD variable values, which often contain secrets (API keys, passwords)." Enabling auto-approval for this command allows the agent to harvest sensitive environment variables without explicit user review for each execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Build logs retrieved via gh run view --log-failed and glab ci trace, as well as PR metadata and status descriptions fetched from GitHub and GitLab APIs.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to ensure the agent treats external content as untrusted data rather than executable instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities (Bash) and uses authenticated CLI tools (gh, glab), which could be leveraged if a malicious instruction embedded in a build log is processed by the agent.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or filtering on the content ingested from CI logs or API responses before presenting it to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 06:05 PM