issue-triage

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from GitHub issues and comments, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub issue bodies and comments are fetched using gh issue list and gh issue view in SKILL.md (Phase 1 and Phase 2).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious content within the issue data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including executing shell commands (gh issue comment/edit/close) and accessing the local clipboard via system tools (pbcopy, xclip, etc.).
  • Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or escape the untrusted GitHub data before it is processed by subagents or used in shell commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell implementation for executing triage actions is vulnerable to command injection.
  • Evidence: In Phase 3: Execution, the skill uses a shell heredoc (<<'TRIAGE_EOF') to pass comment text to the gh CLI. An attacker could craft a GitHub issue comment that includes the delimiter TRIAGE_EOF followed by malicious shell commands, which would then be executed on the user's machine during the automated action phase.
  • Evidence: The clipboard logic in Phase 1 uses echo "{full triage tables}" | xclip, which is susceptible to shell injection if the table content contains characters that break out of the double-quoted string.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 7, 2026, 08:22 PM