skills/dnyoussef/ai-chrome-extension/when-building-backend-api-orchestrate-api-development/Gen Agent Trust Hub
when-building-backend-api-orchestrate-api-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands to manage development environments, infrastructure, and CI/CD pipelines. This includes high-privilege operations like modifying Kubernetes clusters and running build scripts.
- Evidence: Found in SKILL.md using
kubectl apply,kubectl patch, andnpm testacross multiple phases. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow uses package managers to fetch tools and dependencies from the npm registry.
- Evidence: Multiple steps in SKILL.md utilize
npxto run theclaude-flowtool andnpmto install project dependencies. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of code downloaded at runtime from the npm registry, specifically the
claude-floworchestration tool. - Evidence: The workflow repeatedly executes
npx claude-flowfor agent spawning, swarm initialization, and memory management. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface where data from planning phases (requirements) is passed to downstream agents with access to powerful tools.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 captures
REQUIREMENTS_JSONfrom theproduct-manageragent, which is later retrieved and used by thesystem-architectandbackend-developeragents. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to treat the requirements data as untrusted when it is interpolated into agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The agents in the workflow have the capability to execute shell commands (
kubectl,npm), write files, and interact with network services. - Sanitization: No sanitization or schema validation for the
REQUIREMENTS_JSONdata is mentioned before it is consumed by technical agents.
Audit Metadata