github-integration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell command execution across multiple components to orchestrate Git and GitHub operations. Specifically,
resources/scripts/repo-analyzer.jsutilizesexecSyncfor repository analysis, andresources/scripts/release-orchestrator.pyusessubprocess.runto execute Git and curl commands. While functional, this pattern presents a risk if command arguments are derived from untrusted external data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires and executes external dependencies from unverified sources. The setup instructions and examples (e.g.,
examples/example-1-repo-automation.md) direct the agent to install and runclaude-flow@alphaandflow-nexus@latestvia NPM/npx. These tools are not part of the established trusted vendor or service lists and represent an unverified dependency risk. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from GitHub.
- Ingestion points: GitHub webhook payloads including Pull Request titles, descriptions, and issue comments (
resources/scripts/webhook-handler.js). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
execSync,subprocess.run, file-writing tools, and authenticated GitHub API access viaoctokit. - Sanitization: Minimal. The skill uses simple regular expressions to detect slash commands in comments and keywords in issue text, which could be bypassed or manipulated by malicious actors to influence agent behavior.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements logic to generate and execute scripts at runtime. For instance,
example-1-repo-automation.shandrelease-orchestrator.jsare constructed and then executed to perform complex orchestration tasks. This dynamic generation increases the risk of command injection if the templates are populated with unsanitized data. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The Library-First Protocol defined in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to search and extract code patterns and data from broad local system paths (D:\Projects\*). This instruction could lead to the unintended exposure of sensitive information from unrelated projects residing on the agent's host system.
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