reverse-engineering-quick-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted binaries, extracting strings and decompiled code for the agent to review. This data may contain hidden instructions or adversarial content meant to manipulate the agent's analysis.
- Ingestion points: Files
resources/scripts/strings-analyzer.py,resources/scripts/ghidra-headless.sh,resources/scripts/radare2-triage.py, andresources/scripts/ioc-extractor.jsingest binary data for processing. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide specific instructions to help the agent distinguish between data and embedded commands in the output.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses tools like
Bash,Task, andfilesystemwhich allow for significant interaction with the host environment. - Sanitization: Absent. Untrusted content from binaries is not sanitized before being presented to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
resources/scripts/ghidra-headless.shscript generates temporary Python scripts (decompile_all.py,export_callgraph.py) from hardcoded templates to automate Ghidra tasks. These generated scripts are then executed at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to run local scripts that invoke external analysis binaries likeghidra,radare2, andstrings. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation identifies dependencies on standard libraries and tools, recommending installation via
pipandnpmfrom public registries for packages such asr2pipe,pefile, andaxios. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
authorfield inSKILL-meta.yamlidentifies 'ruv' as the author, which differs from the 'dnyoussef' attribution provided in the platform context.
Audit Metadata