web-scraping
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions frequently reference the use of
mcp__claude-in-chrome__javascript_toolwith thejavascript_execaction. This involves executing JavaScript code that is dynamically generated or assembled at runtime to query the DOM of external web pages. While this is the intended functionality of the browser tool, it represents a dynamic execution pattern where untrusted page structures influence the generated code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary purpose is to ingest and process data from arbitrary external web pages, creating an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via the
read_page,get_page_text, andjavascript_tooltools as described in Phase 4 and Phase 5 ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill mandates a planning phase using
sequential-thinkingto define a schema, which helps constrain the agent's focus, but it does not provide explicit instructions to wrap or delimit the ingested web content with safety warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes browser execution via
javascript_tooland data persistence viamemory_store(Phase 7). - Sanitization: The skill includes logic for escaping characters when transforming data to CSV or JSON formats, but it does not specify sanitization or filtering of the raw content to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The author identified in the skill metadata (
ruv) does not match the provided author context (dnyoussef). This discrepancy in theauthorfield inSKILL.mdis a metadata inconsistency, although it is likely an artifact of using a shared template.
Audit Metadata