gpt-image-edit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a third-party command-line interface to interact with an image editing API.
- Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions for invokingruncomfy run openai/gpt-image-2/editwith user-supplied parameters. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a remote Node.js package from a public registry as part of its prerequisites.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddocumentation specifies runningnpm i -g @runcomfy/clito set up the necessary tools. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data such as external image URLs and user prompts.
- Ingestion points: Image URLs and instruction prompts are accepted as input for the CLI command.
- Boundary markers: The skill notes that the CLI transmits data as a JSON body directly, which provides a boundary by avoiding shell expansion of the input.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the CLI to perform remote operations based on the provided inputs.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation routines for the input data are described within the skill body.
Audit Metadata