agents-md
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from repository files, including
AGENTS.md,README.md,CONTRIBUTING.md, and CI configuration files, to perform audits or rewrites. This creates a surface where hidden malicious instructions in those files could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The "Workflow" section in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to read existing project documentation, CI workflows, and package scripts. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or boundary markers to isolate the untrusted file content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of creating and modifying files (modes: Create, Improve, Nest) and generating audit reports.
- Sanitization: No mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping ingested text are mentioned before the data is processed by the model.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses authoritative language to override the agent's default communication style in favor of a specific technical standard.
- Evidence:
references/communication.mdincludes a "Hard rule" for the ASD-STE100 standard, specifically instructing the agent: "Do not skip for tone, polish, or expertise" and "Do not send a reply until the prose passes these checks."
Audit Metadata