heyapi
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external OpenAPI specifications from various remote and local sources to generate TypeScript code.
- Ingestion points: Remote URLs, local file paths, and registry shorthands (e.g., 'hey-api/backend', 'scalar:...', 'readme:...') defined in
SKILL.mdandreferences/setup-config.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when processing these external specifications.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
bunxto execute theopenapi-tsCLI, writes generated files to the local file system (outputpath), and performs network operations to fetch specifications. - Sanitization: The skill relies on the internal parsing and validation logic of the
@hey-api/openapi-tslibrary to handle untrusted input data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates fetching configuration files and API specifications from remote network locations.
- Evidence: Documentation in
references/setup-config.mddemonstrates fetching specs from arbitrary URLs and specialized registries. - Security Configuration: The documentation mentions setting
NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0to accommodate self-signed certificates in development. This practice bypasses standard TLS verification and could be exploited if applied in non-isolated or production-like environments.
Audit Metadata