remotion
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents a pattern for compiling and executing generated code at runtime in
references/ai-generated-video.md. It provides a React hook,useCompiledComposition, which usesnew Functionto execute code transpiled by@babel/standalone. While the documentation includes security warnings regarding sandboxing and CSP, the pattern itself allows for the execution of dynamically generated content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents workflows for ingesting untrusted data that could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User prompts are passed to LLMs to generate code (
references/ai-generated-video.md), andcalculateMetadatafunctions frequently fetch external JSON data viafetch(references/compositions-props.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation suggests using structured output (Zod schemas) and providing specific system prompts for code generation, but does not enforce strict delimiters in the provided code examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
bunxto execute CLI tools, supports network operations throughfetch, and can write arbitrary files to the disk using the<Artifact>component. - Sanitization: The skill mentions stripping Markdown fences and trailing prose from AI outputs, but largely relies on the user to implement secure sandboxing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on and documents the execution of shell commands using
bunxandremotionCLI for project scaffolding, rendering, and version management across various files (e.g.,SKILL.md,references/rendering-ssr.md).
Audit Metadata