logo-design
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a directive in
SKILL.mdinstructing the agent to "fix the scripts directly" if they fail. This encourages autonomous self-modification of the Python scripts in thescripts/directory by the AI agent during runtime. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
load_envfunction inscripts/generate.pyis configured to search for and read.envfiles from several locations outside the skill's own directory, including the user's home directory (~/.claude/skills/.envand~/.claude/.env), which are sensitive locations typically used for storing platform and API credentials. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/generate.pyscript interpolates user-supplied data into an AI generation prompt template (LOGO_PROMPT_TEMPLATE) without sufficient sanitization or the use of protective boundary markers. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points:
args.prompt,args.brand, andargs.brand_contextparameters inscripts/generate.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly concatenated into the prompt string.
- Capability inventory: The script has the ability to write files to the local disk and make authenticated network requests to the Google Gemini API.
- Sanitization: No input validation or escaping is performed on the user-provided strings.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requests the installation of the
google-genaiPython package, which is the official SDK provided by Google for interacting with Gemini models.
Audit Metadata