docling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse documents from external and potentially untrusted sources, which creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions hidden in documents could manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts document inputs from local file paths and arbitrary URLs through the CLI (
SKILL.md,references/cli.md) and the Python SDK (references/python-sdk.md). - Boundary markers: There are no specific boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" guidelines mentioned in the provided documentation to help the agent distinguish between document content and system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill's environment allows for broad command execution capabilities via
Bash(includingpython,pip, anduv), which could be exploited if an agent is successfully subverted via a malicious document. - Sanitization: No sanitization or content filtering mechanisms for extracted text are described in the documentation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external package registries and model repositories to function.
- It installs the
doclinglibrary and its ecosystem (e.g.,docling-core,docling-slim, and framework integrations likelangchain-docling) from PyPI usingpipanduv(references/slim-packaging.md,references/rag.md). - It downloads machine learning model artifacts (e.g., for OCR and layout analysis) from Hugging Face or user-defined paths using the
docling-tools models downloadcommand (references/cli.md,references/python-sdk.md). - It supports offloading processing to remote service endpoints or vision-language model APIs, which involves transmitting document data to external URLs (
references/service-client.md,references/python-sdk.md).
Audit Metadata