create-architecture
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple project documents to generate its technical baseline, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions in those documents could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and greps content from
design/gdd/*.md,docs/engine-reference/, andproject.yamlin Phase 0b. - Boundary markers: While it uses structural grep patterns (e.g.,
^## Detailed Rules) to target specific sections, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded natural language directives within the extracted text. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including
Write,Edit,Bash, and theAgenttool for multi-agent orchestration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the extracted requirements before they are incorporated into the prompt context.
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context execution to hydrate the agent's environment with configuration data at load time.
- Evidence:
!bash "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config --keys review_mode,automation,workflow,docs.densityinSKILL.md(Line 11). - Assessment: This is used to resolve environment-specific settings (e.g.,
docs.density,workflow) using a project-local script. It does not appear to exfiltrate data or access sensitive user files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts to manage system registries and configuration resolution.
- Evidence: Calls to
.claude/hooks/yaml-helper.shand.claude/scripts/registry.shvia theBashtool. - Assessment: These operations are restricted to specific project-relative paths as defined in the
allowed-toolsfrontmatter, supporting the skill's infrastructure for requirement tracking and configuration management.
Audit Metadata