skill-test
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!commandsyntax to execute a shell command during the skill loading phase:!source "${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-.}/.claude/hooks/yaml-helper.sh" 2>/dev/null && resolve_config --keys automation. This command is used to resolve environment-specific configuration values and does not involve exfiltration of sensitive data or unauthorized access to system-level files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and evaluate the content of other instruction files (skills and specs) located within the project's directory structure. This introduces an attack surface where a malicious skill being tested could contain instructions designed to influence the agent's logic during the evaluation process.
- Ingestion points: Phase 2A, 2B, and 2D read content from project-level skill files and rubric definitions.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers when interpolating the content of skills into the evaluation prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has
Writepermissions and is authorized to modifycatalog.yamland create new result files in the framework's results directory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the skill content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses standard file system tools (
Read,Glob,Grep) to iterate through project directories and inspect file contents. These operations are scoped to the project environment and are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of auditing and linting.
Audit Metadata