team-audio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external design and asset files to brief its sub-agents, creating a surface where malicious instructions in those files could be executed by the agents.\n
- Ingestion points: Files in
design/gdd/,design/audio/, andassets/audio/are read during the 'Gather context' phase.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks formal delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating file content into sub-agent prompts.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses tools like
Write,Edit, andBash, and sub-agents like thegameplay-programmerare authorized to modify source code.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not escape or validate the content of the design documents before processing.\n- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the
!bashsyntax to execute a project-local script during the load process to resolve configuration values.\n - Evidence:
!bash "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config --keys review_mode,automation,team.size.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs sub-agents to perform file system writes without the standard user confirmation step normally required by the platform's Collaboration Protocol.\n - Evidence: The "File Write Protocol" section defines a "bounded exception" where sub-agents can write to
production/,docs/, andtests/directories without triggering a confirmation prompt.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to sub-agents to override the platform's safety guidelines regarding tool confirmation.\n - Evidence: The prompt explicitly states: "A subagent spawned here writes without asking, and that is a deliberate, bounded exception rather than an oversight."
Audit Metadata