team-combat
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the '!' prefix to execute a shell command at load time to resolve configuration. The command
bash "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config ...uses an environment variable and path traversal to execute a script located outside the skill's directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts a
[combat feature description]as its primary argument, which is then used to brief various subagents throughout the pipeline. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions in the description could influence subagent behavior. - Ingestion points: The
[combat feature description]argument inSKILL.mdis the primary entry point for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: None identified; user input is distilled and passed directly into subagent prompts without explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including spawning subagents via the
Agenttool, writing and editing files in the repository, and executing bash commands. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the user-provided description.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
allowed-toolsfrontmatter and the dynamic context injection both reference a shell script (yaml-helper.sh) via path traversal (../../hooks/). This introduces a dependency on external code that is not contained within the skill package itself.
Audit Metadata