team-combat

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the '!' prefix to execute a shell command at load time to resolve configuration. The command bash "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config ... uses an environment variable and path traversal to execute a script located outside the skill's directory.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts a [combat feature description] as its primary argument, which is then used to brief various subagents throughout the pipeline. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions in the description could influence subagent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The [combat feature description] argument in SKILL.md is the primary entry point for untrusted data.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; user input is distilled and passed directly into subagent prompts without explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including spawning subagents via the Agent tool, writing and editing files in the repository, and executing bash commands.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the user-provided description.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The allowed-tools frontmatter and the dynamic context injection both reference a shell script (yaml-helper.sh) via path traversal (../../hooks/). This introduces a dependency on external code that is not contained within the skill package itself.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 09:10 AM