team-live-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill executes a shell script (
yaml-helper.sh) at load time using the!syntax to resolve configuration. The script is located in a directory relative to the skill (../../hooks/).- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to bypass standard safety protocols, specifically the requirement to ask for user confirmation before writing or editing files. It labels this a 'deliberate, bounded exception' and instructs subagents to write without asking.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates file-writing operations by subagents without per-file user oversight, relying on phase-level gates instead of individual action confirmations.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input and reads external files, creating a surface where malicious instructions in that data could influence the agent's actions. - Ingestion points: User-provided season/event arguments and external files like
design/live-ops/economy-rules.mdanddesign/live-ops/ethics-policy.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are provided when passing this data to subagents.
- Capability inventory: Subagents have access to
WriteandEdittools, and the orchestrator can execute restrictedBashcommands. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of user-provided strings or file content is performed before interpolation into agent prompts.
Audit Metadata