team-narrative
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to override standard safety protocols (the 'Collaboration Protocol'). It directs the agent to allow sub-agents to write files without individual user approval, defining a 'bounded exception' to reduce operational friction. This instruction actively seeks to bypass the standard confirmation requirements for file modifications.- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!bashsyntax within its documentation to execute a local shell script (yaml-helper.sh) at load time. This is used to dynamically resolve configuration keys likereview_modeandautomationbefore user interaction occurs.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator is designed to read and process external narrative assets, including story bibles and character profiles, which serve as ingestion surfaces for potentially malicious instructions. 1. Ingestion points: Reads files fromdesign/narrative/and character/faction definitions. 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not implement clear delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the story data. 3. Capability inventory: The agent has access toWrite,Edit,Bash, andAgenttools, which could be leveraged if an indirect injection were successful. 4. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the input narrative text is performed before it is passed to sub-agents.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses theBashtool to execute a configuration helper script. The access is restricted to a specific path relative to the skill directory via theallowed-toolsconfiguration.
Audit Metadata