team-release
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to bypass standard safety protocols (specifically the 'Collaboration Protocol' referenced in the text) for file writes. It defines a 'bounded exception' where sub-agents are directed to write to specific paths without asking for user approval, stating 'Do not "fix" this by asking per subagent'.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: By instructing the agent and its sub-agents to ignore mandatory confirmation requirements for file modifications, the skill attempts to escalate its operational capabilities beyond the platform's standard safety constraints.
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection (
!) to execute a bash script at load time. This execution happens automatically when the skill is accessed and uses path traversal (../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh) to execute a script located outside the skill's specific directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
allowed-toolsconfiguration for theBashtool uses a path traversal pattern (*/.claude/skills/team-release/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh) to target a script in a parent directory structure. This allows the skill to execute code from the broader environment rather than just its own packaged scripts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata