style-modeler
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several local Python scripts (
manage_style_registry.py,style_fingerprint.py,normalize_style_frontmatter.py, andsync_claude_runtime.py) to manage its internal data and analyze text samples. The scripts provided in the package demonstrate high security maturity, including strict path validation to prevent directory traversal and the use of temporary files for atomic data persistence. Note thatsync_claude_runtime.pyis referenced in the logic but was not included in the analyzed files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process external article content fetched from URLs, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: External articles are fetched via the
web-article-extractortool and stored indocs/*.mdbefore being parsed by analysis scripts and the agent. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed text, which could allow malicious content in a processed article to influence the agent's behavior during the modeling process.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (running local scripts) and perform filesystem writes (updating the style registry and generating markdown profiles).
- Sanitization: The text analysis script (
style_fingerprint.py) focuses on markdown structure and punctuation statistics; it does not sanitize the text for potential prompt injection patterns.
Audit Metadata