li

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on 'content cards' (内容卡_*.md) or user-pasted 'transfer cards' to maintain state across different steps. This mechanism allows untrusted data to influence the agent's execution flow and parameters for subsequent sub-skills.
  • Ingestion points: Files named 内容卡_*.md in the current working directory and user-provided 'transfer cards' (交接卡) in the chat history.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands within these state files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files, as well as locate and read instructions from other markdown files (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the content of the cards before processing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically identifies, reads, and follows instructions from various sub-skill files (e.g., li-material-mining, li-worth-shooting) based on the current step in the workflow. While these are local files, this dynamic loading of instructions from computed paths constitutes a dynamic execution pattern for AI agents.
  • Evidence: Instructions such as 'Locate and fully read the SKILL.md of that step, execute according to its method' and 'First use the skill paths discovered by the host; if not, search by machine name in the same directory as the current Skill.'
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 06:34 AM