figure-out-team

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided $ARGUMENTS directly into the invocation string for the manifest-dev:figure-out skill. This pattern can lead to argument injection if the platform does not strictly validate the input, allowing a user to potentially add unauthorized flags or modify the command structure.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from Slack channels and threads involving multiple parties. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where an adversary participating in the Slack discussion could embed instructions to manipulate the agent's logic or exfiltrate context from the deliberation.
  • Ingestion points: Multi-party deliberations within Slack channels or threads.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are defined in the wrapper to separate user deliberation content from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill (via the underlying figure-out core) can read Slack history, post messages, and access documentation or logs unless specifically disabled by flags.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the Slack message content before it is processed by the agent's orchestration logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 09:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — figure-out-team