figure-out-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided
$ARGUMENTSdirectly into the invocation string for themanifest-dev:figure-outskill. This pattern can lead to argument injection if the platform does not strictly validate the input, allowing a user to potentially add unauthorized flags or modify the command structure. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from Slack channels and threads involving multiple parties. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where an adversary participating in the Slack discussion could embed instructions to manipulate the agent's logic or exfiltrate context from the deliberation.
- Ingestion points: Multi-party deliberations within Slack channels or threads.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are defined in the wrapper to separate user deliberation content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill (via the underlying
figure-outcore) can read Slack history, post messages, and access documentation or logs unless specifically disabled by flags. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the Slack message content before it is processed by the agent's orchestration logic.
Audit Metadata