tend-pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes PR comments which are untrusted external data. These comments are classified and then used to drive actions, including code fixes via the /do skill.
  • Ingestion points: PR comments are fetched from platforms like GitHub (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are defined to isolate untrusted comment text when passed to the classification or fix logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can invoke the /do tool (for code modification), the /loop tool (for persistence of the tending process), and PR platform actions such as merging or closing PRs.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content of PR comments before they influence the agent's decision-making process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing other agent capabilities such as /do and /loop. While these are expected within the platform, they are triggered by the analysis of external, potentially adversarial PR comments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 08:11 AM