tend-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes PR comments which are untrusted external data. These comments are classified and then used to drive actions, including code fixes via the
/doskill. - Ingestion points: PR comments are fetched from platforms like GitHub (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are defined to isolate untrusted comment text when passed to the classification or fix logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can invoke the
/dotool (for code modification), the/looptool (for persistence of the tending process), and PR platform actions such as merging or closing PRs. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the content of PR comments before they influence the agent's decision-making process.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing other agent capabilities such as
/doand/loop. While these are expected within the platform, they are triggered by the analysis of external, potentially adversarial PR comments.
Audit Metadata