eliminate-redundant-restores
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection Surface: The skill instructs the agent to ingest and analyze external data from CI definitions, build scripts, and logs. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in these files could potentially influence the agent's actions during the optimization and validation process. The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps for this untrusted content.
- Local Command Execution: The workflow involves identifying and executing dotnet and msbuild commands, including a validation step where the modified build pipeline is run. This behavior is confined to the project's build environment and is necessary for the skill's primary purpose of build optimization.
- Configuration File Analysis: The skill accesses repository configuration files such as NuGet.config and MSBuild response files (.rsp) to determine restore settings. This access is limited to reading build parameters and does not involve exfiltrating sensitive data.
Audit Metadata