doubleword
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external JSONL payloads and fetches live documentation from
doubleword.aianddocs.doubleword.ai, creating a surface for potential injection of malicious instructions via untrusted data. - Ingestion points: Local JSONL data files, external product/model indexes (
llms.txt), and markdown documentation pages fetched at runtime. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions explicitly require the agent to validate JSONL files locally using
dw files validateanddw files statsbefore any upload or processing occurs. - Capability inventory: Terminal execution for
dwCLI commands, Python code execution via theautobatcherlibrary, and network requests viacurlto the vendor's API. - Sanitization: Relies on the
dwCLI's built-in validation tools to verify payload structure and integrity before transmission. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the
dwCLI andcurlto perform inference and manage data jobs. - Evidence: Includes recipes for
dw realtime,dw batches create, anddw stream. These commands are directed towards the vendor's official services. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and model metadata from the vendor's infrastructure.
- Evidence: Instructions include fetching from
https://doubleword.ai/llms.txtandhttps://docs.doubleword.ai/to maintain up-to-date model information.
Audit Metadata