intent-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes 'Intent', 'Snap', and 'Decision' objects which contain natural language fields such as 'what' and 'why'. These fields are read back during the recovery phase via the
itt inspectcommand. If these fields contain malicious instructions, they could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Data entering the agent context via
itt inspectfrom files stored in.intent/. - Boundary markers: None explicitly present in the data format to distinguish instructions from historical text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
ittcommands and perform network operations viaitt push(inscripts/itt_argv.pyandsrc/intent_cli/hub/client.py). - Sanitization: No explicit content filtering is performed on the historical text before it is presented to the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
README.mdprovides instructions for users to install the required CLI tool by downloading and executing shell and PowerShell scripts directly from the project's GitHub repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill and its underlying CLI tool utilize
subprocess.runandsubprocess.Popenin several locations (e.g.,src/intent_cli/store.py,src/intent_cli/hub/credentials.py, andscripts/itt_argv.py) to interact with Git, Docker, and theittbinary itself. The skill instructions specifically require using a bundled Python runner (scripts/itt_argv.py) that disables shell evaluation and uses strict argument encoding to mitigate command injection risks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup process documented in
README.mdinvolves piping remote content to a shell for installation (e.g.,curl ... | bash). This behavior is limited to the initial setup by the user and targets scripts hosted within the vendor's own repository.
Audit Metadata