spec-loop-setup-doc-rendering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs environment verification using shell commands such as
java -version,dot -V, andcommand -v. It also uses the VS Code CLI (code --list-extensions,code --install-extension) to manage IDE extensions via thescripts/setup-vscode-server-based.shscript. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from untrusted sources within the project repository, such as
.idea/and.vscode/configuration directories andglossary.adocfiles. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions in these files could influence the agent's behavior, especially given its capabilities to execute commands and install software. - Ingestion points: Project-local configuration files (
.idea/,.vscode/, workspace files) and documentation files (glossary.adoc,glossary.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions include a requirement to ask for user confirmation before changing plugins, extensions, or IDE settings, which serves as a manual checkpoint.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands for dependency checking (
java,dot,test) and interact with the editor CLI to install extensions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or validation of the content read from the project-local files before it is processed by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
vscode-setup.mdfile contains a privacy warning regarding themyml.vscode-markdown-plantuml-previewextension, noting that it sends encoded diagram data to the publicplantuml.comserver for rendering. This is presented as a transparent disclosure of standard extension behavior rather than a malicious exfiltration attempt.
Audit Metadata