buffer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
emacsclient --evalto execute Lisp code in the user's Emacs environment. It constructs these commands by interpolating user-provided strings (such as the buffer name and search regex) directly into the Lisp form. A malicious user could provide a buffer name containing Lisp delimiters and additional commands (e.g.,*scratch*\") (shell-command \"rm -rf /\") (list :buffer \") to achieve arbitrary code execution within the Emacs process. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read the contents of any Emacs buffer and return the text to the agent. This exposes sensitive information, including internal system logs (
*Messages*), configuration files (like~/.emacs), and any other private data the user may have open in their editor. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions direct the agent to automatically treat any buffer-name reference in a user prompt as a request to read that buffer. This design makes it easier for an attacker to trigger the data exposure or Lisp injection vulnerabilities without the user explicitly calling a dangerous command.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The
agent-skill-bufferfunction reads content from external Emacs buffers into the agent's context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None are present; the text is returned raw to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to runemacsclient, which can execute arbitrary shell commands via Emacs'shell-commandfunction. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the buffer content before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata