ent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The helper script
agent-skill-ent.eluses the Emacs Lisploadfunction to execute the contents of.ent.elfiles found in the project directory. If an agent is working in a malicious repository, this allows the execution of arbitrary Lisp code within the user's running Emacs server.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to invokeemacsclient --eval, which executes shell commands and Lisp functions on the host system. While this is the intended functionality for running build tasks, it is leveraged to execute untrusted project code.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Theagent-skill-ent-runandagent-skill-ent-logfunctions return the entire contents of the*ent-log*buffer to the agent. This may contain sensitive information such as environment variables, authentication tokens, or private project data printed during the build process.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to process the untrusted output from build tasks verbatim. An attacker could place malicious instructions in the build output (e.g., via a crafted.ent.elor task failure message) to influence the agent's subsequent actions.\n - Ingestion points: Full contents of the
*ent-log*buffer (referenced inSKILL.mdandagent-skill-ent.el).\n - Boundary markers: None. The instructions explicitly direct the agent to "Work with it directly" and "Present :text to the user verbatim".\n
- Capability inventory: Access to the
Bashtool and file system manipulation.\n - Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization is performed on the log content before it is passed to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata