transcribe-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads Python packages
openai-whisper,yt-dlp, andtorchfrom official package registries (PyPI) and the official PyTorch CUDA index during setup. - Evidence:
uv pip install --python whisper-env torch --index-url https://download.pytorch.org/whl/cu124inSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads system tools from well-known sources (Astral, winget, Homebrew, apt) to ensure proper functioning.
- Evidence:
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shinreferences/install.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/transcribe.pyexecutesyt-dlpandwhisperbinaries viasubprocess.runto handle audio/video processing. These calls use list-based arguments which mitigate shell injection risks. - Evidence:
subprocess.run([yt_dlp, source, "-o", "yt_tmp.%(ext)s", "--no-playlist"], ...)inscripts/transcribe.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (video/audio from URLs or local files) through transcription.
- Ingestion points: URL or file path provided to
scripts/transcribe.py. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for the resulting text, but the
disable-model-invocation: trueflag in the frontmatter prevents the agent from automatically acting on the transcript output, significantly reducing injection risk. - Capability inventory: File system writes (transcript file), network access (via
yt-dlp), and subprocess execution. - Sanitization: None on the transcript content, though it is output as a plain
.txtfile.
Audit Metadata