loop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/loop-file.shandscripts/loop-task.shexecute theralphcommand with the--allow-allflag. This flag is explicitly designed to auto-approve all tool permissions, effectively removing human-in-the-loop (HITL) oversight and allowing the agent to execute shell commands, modify files, and access the network without requesting user confirmation for each tool use. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation (
references/ralph-options.md) and installation checks in the scripts refer to and encourage the installation of the@th0rgal/ralph-wiggumpackage from the npm registry and its associated GitHub repository (Th0rgal/opencode-ralph-wiggum). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an iterative loop that is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. If the agent is instructed to process untrusted data (such as external source code or documentation) as part of a task, malicious instructions hidden in that data could hijack the agent's behavior. Ingestion points: The
loop-file.shscript reads instructions from markdown files (PROMPT_FILE) which may contain untrusted content. Boundary markers: There are no markers or system-level instructions in the scripts to prevent the AI from following commands embedded within the data it reads. Capability inventory: The underlying agent possesses comprehensive capabilities (shell access, file manipulation, etc.) which are granted full autonomy via the--allow-allflag. Sanitization: The skill lacks any mechanism to sanitize or validate the input data before it is processed by the AI in the loop.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata