rterm-gateway
Audited by Socket on Jul 31, 2026
4 alerts found:
SecurityAnomalyx2MalwareSUSPICIOUS. The skill's broad remote-control capabilities mostly match its stated purpose, but its footprint is extremely high-risk: it enables autonomous command execution, file transfer, configuration changes, and scheduling across remote systems. The largest concrete trust issue is the optional download/use of an unverifiable websocat.exe from a personal raw GitHub URL, potentially with gateway tokens. This looks like a legitimate but dangerous operations skill rather than confirmed malware.
This file is best characterized as an administrative WebSocket RPC client that triggers remote PowerShell execution through an external gateway/agent to update Windows Defender signatures on configured WinRM connections, then reports a parsed output value. While the PowerShell command is hardcoded (reducing direct injection risk from this script alone), the presence of rpc('agent:startTask') constitutes a powerful remote-execution capability. Additional concerns include an unusual hardcoded fallback path for loading the ws dependency and reduced observability due to swallowed errors. No clear evidence of self-contained malware exists in this module, but security impact can be high depending on gateway/agent trust and endpoint control.
No clear evidence of local malware (no obfuscation, eval/Function, process spawning, or hidden exfiltration). However, the tool is strongly dual-use and can facilitate remote command execution and remote file reading by sending attacker-controlled instructions/paths through WebSocket RPC to a gateway. If the gateway is reachable or access controls are weak, this can directly lead to sensitive data disclosure and unauthorized remote actions. The import-candidate logic for 'ws' is mildly anomalous but likely intended for robustness.
This module is highly suspicious because it remotely registers and enables a cron scheduled task via RPC (settings:set) containing clearly destructive system commands (cache file deletion and journal vacuuming). If an attacker can influence the gateway endpoint or if the gateway lacks strong authorization, this behavior can be used for sabotage rather than benign maintenance. The hardcoded developer-machine fallback for requiring ws is an additional anomaly, though the primary risk is the remote automation write with destructive payload.