rterm-plugin
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
PluginContextAPI provides actx.exec(command, opts?)method that allows plugins to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system. While described as gated by policy, this provides a direct path for command execution that could be abused by a malicious plugin. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes a
web-intelplugin that spawns sidecar daemons usingctx.spawnProcessto runnpx -y wigolo serve. Spawning processes from dynamically loaded plugins constitutes a remote code execution vector if the plugin source or configuration is compromised. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/test-plugin.mjscontains a hardcoded absolute file path (/Users/olu/work/RTerm/packages/backend/src/services/plugin/pluginRegistry.ts) to import thePluginRegistry. This pattern is fragile and suggests the tool is tailored for a specific local environment, which can be a security risk if it forces an agent to interact with unauthorized or unexpected local file paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/scaffold-plugin.mjsscript usesprocess.env.USERand executes directory creation/file writing based on user-supplied command line arguments without significant sanitization, which could lead to path traversal if the--outor--namearguments are manipulated.
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