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Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on several well-known and trusted external libraries for its core functionality.
- Python dependencies:
nats-py,anthropic,openai,jsonschema, and OpenTelemetry SDKs. - Node.js dependencies:
nats,@anthropic-ai/sdk,openai, anduuid. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated scans detected a pattern involving piping network output to a Python interpreter. In several example scripts (e.g.,
examples/cross-org/test.shandexamples/cross-org/README.md), the skill fetches JSON data from a local NATS monitoring port and pipes it topython3 -corpython3 -m json.toolfor parsing or formatting. While this involves piping data to an interpreter, the source islocalhostand the execution is intended for data processing in a developer environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple examples and setup guides (e.g.,
examples/cli/complete-cli-mesh.sh,setup.sh) execute shell commands to manage NATS servers, generate cryptographic keys, and run agent processes. These are consistent with the skill's purpose as a developer implementation guide. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains multiple 'LLM Agent' examples that are susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through NATS message payloads in
claude-agent.ts,claude_agent.py, andorchestrator-agent.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters to wrap the
payload.input.messagebefore passing it to the model. - Capability inventory: The agents have the capability to make API calls to Anthropic or OpenAI models (e.g.,
claude.messages.create) based on these inputs. - Sanitization: Absent; the inputs are interpolated directly into the message content.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: http://localhost:8222/leafz - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata