alphafold-database
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
download_proteomefunction inSKILL.mdconstructs a shell command by interpolating thetaxonomy_idvariable into a string and executing it viasubprocess.run(cmd, shell=True). This implementation is vulnerable to shell command injection if thetaxonomy_idis provided by an untrusted source without sanitization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data and providing command execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves metadata and identifiers from external APIs including the UniProt API (
urllib.request.urlopen) and the AlphaFold REST API (requests.get) as documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/api_reference.md. - Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to treat fetched biological data as untrusted or to ignore potential instructions embedded in protein metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system operations (
open().write()), network communication (requests,urllib), and arbitrary shell command execution (subprocess.run). - Sanitization: There is no logic shown for validating or escaping input parameters (such as
taxonomy_id,query, oralphafold_id) before they are incorporated into shell commands or API requests. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches protein structures, confidence metrics, and bulk datasets from the AlphaFold Database hosted by EMBL-EBI and Google Cloud Public Datasets. These are recognized, well-known services within the structural biology community.
Audit Metadata