mcp-management

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute external commands and binaries as specified in the local .claude/.mcp.json configuration file.
  • Evidence: scripts/mcp-client.ts uses the StdioClientTransport from the MCP SDK to spawn subprocesses using the command and arguments provided in the user-managed configuration.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends the installation of several external tools and packages to provide full functionality.
  • Evidence: README.md and SKILL.md suggest installing gemini-cli and various MCP server packages such as @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory and @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem using npm or npx.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external MCP servers and presents it to the agent, creating a surface for instructions embedded in tool outputs to influence behavior.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters via getAllTools, getAllPrompts, getAllResources, and callTool methods in scripts/mcp-client.ts.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands in the tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can spawn subprocesses (scripts/mcp-client.ts) and write to the filesystem (scripts/cli.ts writes to assets/tools.json).
  • Sanitization: Absent. Content from external tools is not filtered or validated before being passed to the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports tools that enable the execution of dynamic scripts in isolated environments.
  • Evidence: The provided assets/tools.json includes a definition for the evaluate_script tool from the chrome-devtools server, which allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within a browser context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 12:15 PM