mcp-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute external commands and binaries as specified in the local
.claude/.mcp.jsonconfiguration file. - Evidence:
scripts/mcp-client.tsuses theStdioClientTransportfrom the MCP SDK to spawn subprocesses using the command and arguments provided in the user-managed configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation recommends the installation of several external tools and packages to provide full functionality.
- Evidence:
README.mdandSKILL.mdsuggest installinggemini-cliand various MCP server packages such as@modelcontextprotocol/server-memoryand@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystemusingnpmornpx. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external MCP servers and presents it to the agent, creating a surface for instructions embedded in tool outputs to influence behavior.
- Ingestion points: External data enters via
getAllTools,getAllPrompts,getAllResources, andcallToolmethods inscripts/mcp-client.ts. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands in the tool outputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill can spawn subprocesses (
scripts/mcp-client.ts) and write to the filesystem (scripts/cli.tswrites toassets/tools.json). - Sanitization: Absent. Content from external tools is not filtered or validated before being passed to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports tools that enable the execution of dynamic scripts in isolated environments.
- Evidence: The provided
assets/tools.jsonincludes a definition for theevaluate_scripttool from thechrome-devtoolsserver, which allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within a browser context.
Audit Metadata