council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted data into prompts for background sub-agents (Skeptic, Pragmatist, and Critic).
- Ingestion points: The variables
[DECISION QUESTION]and[COMPACT CONTEXT]are directly inserted into the instructions for three parallel agents within thetaskblocks inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates lack explicit boundary markers (such as XML tags or dedicated delimiters) or defensive instructions to prevent the interpolated data from overriding the sub-agent's persona or instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the platform's background task orchestration to spawn additional agents and consumes their output via
read_agentfor synthesis. - Sanitization: There are no visible steps to sanitize, escape, or validate the content of the decision question or context before it is passed to the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata